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In City of Ladue v. 
Gil/eo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994), 
the United States Supreme 
Court held that an ordinance 
banning homeowners from dis-
playing signs containing per-
sonal, political orreligious mes-
sages violates the First Amend-
ment because it restricts a cher-
ished means of communication. 
In so holding, the Court greatly 
curbed municipality police pow-
ers to prevent overreaching 
regulation of residential signs 
and reacknowledged a special 
respect for individual liberty in 
the home. 
Respondent Margaret 
P. Gilleo, a resident of Ladue, 
Missouri, was prohibited from 
displaying a sign in the second 
floor window of her home that 
stated "For Peace in the Gulf'. 
The city of Ladue ("Ladue") 
cited a city ordinance as the basis 
forGilleo'sviolation Theordinance 
prohibited homeowners from 
displaying signs on their prop-
erty, with the exception of "res i-
dential identification" signs, 
"for sale" signs, and safety haz-
ard signs. The ordinance al-
lowed further exceptions to this 
sweeping ban by permitting 
churches, schools, and non-
profit groups to display certain 
signs not allowed on residential 
property. The ordinance re-
cited its principal purpose as 
enabling the city to minimize the 
visual clutter associated with 
the prohibited signs. Gilleo chal-
lenged this ordinance by suing 
the city of Ladue, its Mayor, and 
the members ofthe Ladue City 
Council in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District ofMissouri, alleging that 
the ordinance violated her First 
Amendmentrightoffree speech. 
After a finding by the 
district court that Ladue's sign 
ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the city appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. In upholding 
the district court's decision, the 
court of appeals determined that 
the ordinance was a content-
based regulation, and therefore, 
unconstitutional. In so holding, 
the court of appeals concluded 
that the interest of Ladue to 
reduce visual clutter was "not 
sufficiently compelling" to al-
low Ladue to treat "commer-
cial speech more favorably than 
noncommercial speech" and 
favor "some kinds of noncom-
mercial speech over others." 
The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the ordinance 
violated a Ladue resident's right 
to free speech under the First 
. Amendment. 
In its analysis, the Court 
recognized that, while signs are 
protected speech under the First 
Amendment, physical charac-
teristics of signs can pose prob-
lems that are properly subj ectto 
regulation under a municipality , s 
police powers. Id. at 9. Such 
pro blems arise when signs "take 
up space and may obstruct views, 
distract motorists, [and] displace 
alternative uses for land ... " 
!d. at 10. However, the Court 
pointed out that because signs 
are a means of communication, 
the regulation of this medium 
"inevitably affects communica-
tion itself." Id. at 10. Such an 
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ordinance can be challenged as 
to its constitutionality on two 
distinct grounds: the ordinance 
restricts too little speech be-
cause its exemptions discrimi-
nate on the basis of the sign's 
messages and, alternatively, the 
ordinance simply prohibits too 
much speech. !d. at 15-16. 
The court of appeals 
relied on the notion that the 
ordinance restricted too little 
speech and was prone to view-
point and content-based dis-
crimination. Id. at 9. In chal-
lenging this holding, Ladue ar-
gued that its ordinance banning 
certain types of residential signs 
was to reduce visual clutter and 
was content-neutral. Id. at 18. 
Its rationale was that only a few 
residents would display "for 
sale" or "for rent" signs at one 
time, thereby not imposing any 
threat of visual clutter. This rea-
soning explained the exemptions 
for on-site commercial and or-
ganizational signs, given the fact 
that Ladue only had a few 
churches, schools, and busi-
nesses. Id. at 18-19. 
Rejecting this rationale, 
the Supreme Court noted that 
Ladue's ban was a total prohibi-
tion of residential signs with 
only a few exceptions. There-
fore, in theory, Ladue could 
correct the inadequacies of the 
ordinance by simply repealing 
all of the exemptions. Id. at 20. 
The Court found credence in 
the notion that the ordinance, 
with its limited exemptions, pro-
hibited too much speech. By 
assuming that the ordinance was 
content-neutral as Ladue ar-
gued, the Court reasoned that 
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Ladue's "interest in allowing 
certain messages to be conveyed 
by means of residential signs 
outweighs the aesthetic interest 
in eliminating outdoor signs" 
and that Ladue had not imposed 
a flat ban on signs because it had 
determined that at least some of 
them were too vital to be banned. 
!d. at 19-20. 
The Court held that by 
almost completely banning resi-
dential signs, the ordinance to-
tally foreclosed a distinguished 
means of communication to per-
sonal, political, orreligious mes-
sages, and posed a danger to 
freedom of speech by eliminat-
ing a shared method of commu-
nication. Id. at 22-23. The 
Court acknowledged that this 
form of communication plays a 
vital role in society, such as a 
person proclaiming his or her 
support for a particular candi-
date in a political campaign. Id. 
at 22. 
Ladue argued that its 
ordinance merely regulated the 
"time, place, or manner" of this 
speech "because residents re-
main free to convey their de-
sired messages by other means, 
such as hand-held signs, 'let-
ters, handbills, flyers, telephone 
calls, newspaper advertisements, 
bumper stickers, speeches, and 
neighborhood or community 
meetings. '" Id. at 25 (quoting 
Brieffor Petitioners at 41). The 
Court rejected the notion that 
these other modes of communi-
cation were adequate substitutes· 
for noncommercial residential 
signs for the following reasons: 
1) signs allow the identity ofthe 
speaker to be known which lends 
to the persuasiveness of a mes-
sage; 2) signs displayed on a 
homeowner's lawn or in a win-
dow are relatively inexpensive 
whereas the alternatives sug-
gested by Ladue can be very 
costly; and 3) signs allow a per-
son to effectively target their 
neighbors whereas the alterna-
tives suggested by Ladue can-
not reach this audience as suc-
cessfully. Gil/eo at 25-27. 
With its decision in City 
of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Su-
preme Court greatly restricted 
a municipality's police powers 
in prohibiting residential signs 
containing personal, political, 
or religious messages. In so 
doing, the Court reaffirmed the 
law's respect for individual lib-
erty in the home and its special 
protection of the exercise of 
free speech. The Court con-
cluded that the suppression of 
this speech evokes a dangerous 
pattern of governmental con-
straints on pri vate behavior that 
would jeopardize a form of com-
munication unique in its broad 
access to the public and its ef-
fectiveness in carrying its mes-
sage to its targeted audience. 
Recognizing these dangers, the 
Supreme Court, with its hold-
ing, protected the right to this 
form of speech for all American 
citizens. 
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